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PROFESSIONALISM IN THE POSTMODERN AGE:
ITS DEATH, ATTEMPTS AT RESUSCITATION,
AND ALTERNATE SOURCES OF VIRTUE
ROBERT

F.

COCHRAN, JR.*

There is a new emphasis on professionalism within legal
education and the organized bar. The leaders of the profession
call on lawyers to go beyond the incentives of the market and
beyond the requirements of the professional rules-to seek justice, to be more honest and tolerant, to be less adversarial and
selfish, and to give more of their time and resources to the poor.
They call on law professors to instill these values in law students.
The moral basis for this call to service is our status as professionals. The word "professionalism" appears almost as a mantra, a
word which if repeated often enough will release mystical moral
power.1 But, whatever power it once had, calls to professionalism
no longer seem to inspire.
This focus on professionalism comes at a time when the reputation of the legal profession has fallen to new depths,2 but it
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Pepperdine University; J.D., University of Virginia, 1976. I would like to thank Tom Shaffer and Howard Lesnick for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay and Michelle Pirozzi
and Stacey Rock for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The President's Message: The Professional
Responsibility of Professional Schools, AALS NEWSL., Feb. 1998, at 1-5; Deborah L.
Rhode, The President's Message: Professional Education and Professional Values,
AALS NEWSL., Apr. 1998, at 1, 4;JeromeJ. Shestack, President'sMessage: Advancing Professionalism Needs JudicialHelp, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 8; Jerome J. Shestack, President'sMessage: Our ContinuingProfessional Odyssey, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998,
at 8; andJeromeJ. Shestack, Taking ProfessionalismSeriously, Aug. 1998, at 70. See
also A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 48-69 (containing three additional articles on professionalism). In President's Message: Advancing Professionalism Needs Judicial
Help, supra, President Shestack uses the term "professionalism" or one of its
variations 22 times, much as President Rhode uses the term twice in the tides of
each of her first two messages as AALS President. The attempt, of course, is to

use the moral resonance of the term to call lawyers to action. I think, however,
that the term has lost its power. President Shestack's title and article suggest
the quandary of the profession; professionalism is no longer an internal moral
drive shared by lawyers; it must be required by judges.
2. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993);
ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM 2 (1986), quoted in RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 243 (1989). In 1986, the ABA Commission on Professionalism
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has a familiar ring. As day follows night, since the 1960s, each
decade has seen a series of highly-publicized, lawyer-led scandals
followed by the organized bar's attempt to create a cleansing
wave of professionalism. The Watergate scandals of the 1970s
were followed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
MPRE, and required, law school courses on professional responsibility; the securities and savings and loan scandals of the 1980s
were followed by the ABA's In the Spirit of Public Service: A
Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism and the Third
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers; and, now, the O.J.
and Menendez trials, Whitewater and Zippergate are yielding
their own calls for professionalism.'
Though I wish the new professionalism well, I am not hopeful. In a postmodern age, there is little common moral ground
to which we can appeal. 4 I fear that the foundations for professionalism are gone. Moreover, the concept of professionalism
carries dubious baggage. In a postmodern age, there may be
greater hope in encouraging lawyers to explore their own moral
and religious traditions for lawyerly ideals. In this essay, I consider the traditional concept of professionalism, its death in the
postmodern era, and alternate possibilities for lawyer renewal.
I.

TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of professionalism emerged from the religious
orders of the Middle Ages. To be a professional was originally to
profess something, a commitment to one's religious order.5 Some
found that "only 6% of corporate users of legal services rated 'all or most' lawyers as deserving to be called 'professionals.' Only 7% saw professionalism
increasing among lawyers; 68% said it had decreased over time. Similarly, 55%
of the state and federal judges . . . said lawyer professionalism was declining."
Id. (citations omitted).
3. Rayman Solomon traces the pattern of crisis followed by a focus on
professionalism back even farther. He finds that five crises between 1925 and
1960 (prohibition, the great depression, court-packing and the growth of federal regulation, McCarthyism, and the specter of federally funded legal services) each generated its own focus on professionalism within the bar. See
Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 19251960, in LAwYERs' IDEALs/LAwYERs' PRACT7ICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION

(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).

4. Russell Pearce has argued that we are experiencing a paradigm shift in
which both the public and lawyers have come to view law as a business, rather
than a profession. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism ParadigmShift: Why
DisregardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1246-67 (1995). Pearce argues that, rather than seek to
restore law as a profession, we should regulate it as a business.
5. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE "TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL" IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 19 (1992).
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of the religious orders developed expertise in special disciplines:
divinity, law, and medicine. The term "professional" came to
describe those with special expertise in these areas.6
As the legal profession evolved in England and the United
States, it lost its religious character. In the United States, lawyers
became, in de Tocqueville's phrase, "the American aristocracy."7
The founders of the American Bar Association in the late nineteenth century were "primarily well-to-do business lawyers, of old
American stock," and sought to create an elite organization of
the "best men of the bar."8 Through most of the twentieth century the organized bar remained primarily in the control of those
in large, big-city law firms, the "male, Anglo-Saxon, upper-class
Protestants who attended elite law schools."9
Professional ethics were the ethics of gentlemenl°-the
generic, Judeo-Christian ethics of the upper class churches.
They were embodied in statements of professional aspiration:
law professor David Hoffman's Observations on ProfessionalDeportment (1817),l 1 Judge George Sharswood's Essay on ProfessionalEthics (1854),12 the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1908), and
the "Ethical Considerations" of the ABA's Code of Professional
Responsibility (1969). Leaders of the bar argued that the practice of law should be a life "dedicated primarily to the public
service .

.

. [and] the fact that it is a means of livelihood to its

members is purely coincidental."1 3
The foundation for the lawyer's professional (and moral)
responsibility was his (almost always his1 4 ) belief that he had been
given much, and that with his circumstantial superiority went
responsibilities. It was a matter of noblesse oblige. This was a
6. See DENNIS M. CAMPBELL, DOCTORS, LAwYERs, MINISTERS: CHRISTIAN
ETHICS IN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 19 (1982).
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 125 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1984).
8. John A. Matzko, "The Best Men at the Bar": The Founding of the American
Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA

75 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984), quoted in Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as
Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy,28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 669 & n.56
(1984).
9. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 208-11; Mashburn, supra note 8, at 674.
10. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal
Ethics: Lawyer Professionalismas a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 397-404
(1990).
11. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (1817).
12. George Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics, 32 ABA REP. 1 (5th
ed. 1907).
13. Thomas B. Hill, Jr., The President'sAnnualAddress, 14 ALA. LAWYER 342,
346 (1953).
14. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 90.
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message that bar leaders had heard all of their lives. It was
preached at elite Anglican and Episcopalian prep schools over
the centuries. "From everyone to whom much has been given,
much will be required ... .-'5 The headmaster's speech to the

193rd entering class at St. Matthew's School in the movie School
Ties

16

was typical:

You, my boys, are among the elite of the nation and we
strive here at St. Matthew's to prepare you for the heavy
responsibility that comes with favored position. Today,
more than ever, this country needs an elite that cares more
for honor than for advantage, more for service than for
personal gain. To that end let us beseech the help of God
in whose name we pray.
(In the movie, the lower-class Jewish boy, who had been admitted
on an athletic scholarship, found the speech more odd than
inspiring.1 7 ) The legal profession's manifestation of this ethic
was its call for a life of public service in the law.
My point is not that the gentlemen of earlier generations
always lived up to their ideals. At times they did; at times they did
not.18 (One of the themes of School Ties is that often they did
not.) But the traditional professional ideals were built on a
deeply rooted moral foundation that was widely shared among
the leaders of the bar.
II.

THE DEATH OF PROFESSIONALISM

Over its history, membership at the bar has gradually
opened to outsiders despite the resistance of the bar's professional elites.1" Women, the Baptist and Methodist descendants
15. Luke 12:48.
16. SCHOOL TIES (Paramount Pictures 1992).
17. I am not suggesting that his Jewish heritage did not provide a basis for
public service-I later make the point that it does. My point is that appeals to
elitism are unlikely to be effective with those who do not consider themselves to
be elite.
18. See Theodore Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism:
The ABA 'sAncillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARiz. L. Rrv. 363, 375 n.77
(1993) (providing studies showing that those with higher income are most willing to engage in pro bono public service); Monroe Freedman, A Brief "Professional" History, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at 22. As David Luban has said,
"Perhaps it would be most accurate to view the elite late-nineteenth-century bar
as a somewhat schizophrenic mix of public spirit and private service." David
Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Traditionin the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND.L. REv. 717,
720 (1988).
19.

See generally JEROLD S. AURERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:

LAWYERS AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (discussing how the common people were denied access to the elite law schools and law firms); id. at 25, 29.
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of the Great Awakenings, the Jewish and Catholic children of
immigrants, and the great-grandchildren of African slaves found
places as members of the bar, though not generally in its leadership. At first, the attempt was to re-educate the newcomers.
They were taught to wear coats and ties to law school class-the
dress of the upper class. They were taught the King's English. I
still recall my law professors in the mid-1970s correcting my middle-class rhetoric. English barristers were more methodical at
this than their American cousins-at-the-bar. They required the
natives of the Commonwealth countries to come to London for a
year, to dress for dinner each night at the Inns of Court, and to
learn the manners of English gentlemen. But in a more egalitarian country like the United States, the leaders of the bar could
only provide so much cultural re-education.
The elitist foundations of professionalism in the United
States crumbled in the 1960s and 70s for several reasons. The
diversity of the profession greatly increased. The number of
minority law students in ABA law schools went from 1% in 1965
to 9.9% in 1983-84.2o Opening the bar was a matter of justice,
but as the bar has grown more diverse, elitist appeals to professionalism have had decreasing appeal. It may be that "[f]rom
everyone to whom much has been given, much will be required,"
but the new members of the bar had not been given much.
Many of those from the middle class felt that they had earned it.
Many of those from minority groups felt that they were owed
more. The new admittees questioned the teachings of their professional elders. Why should they trust the moral instruction of
those who had excluded their mothers and fathers? It is not surprising that appeals to an ethic founded on elitism did not
inspire. My point is not that the new admittees did not have
moral values that could guide them in their law practices; it is
merely that calls to professionalism no longer served as a source
1
of inspiration.

2

Leaders of the bar expressed special concern about allowing immigrants to
become lawyers. See ABEL, supra note 2,at 69 (Character tests "were deliberately
introduced in order to exclude immigrants and their sons"), 109 ("At the
beginning of this century, the professional elite were quite open about their
desire to exclude Jewish and Catholic Eastern and Southern European immigrants and their sons."); AURERBACH, supra, at 99-100, 121-22.
20. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 100-01.
21. Anthony Kronman has argued that the opening of large law firms to
diverse groups has undercut the ability of those firms to maintain common ideals. See KRoNMAN,supranote 2, at 291-94. "[T]he cultural milieu that large-firm
lawyers now inhabit repudiates not only the worst prejudices of the past but its
highest ideals of craftsmanship and character as well." Id. at 291. With the loss
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Not only did appeals to professionalism fail to inspire the
new admittees, they no longer inspired the children of the elite.
The children of the upper class became ambivalent about their
status. The dream of the children of the 60s was an egalitarian
dream: "Power to the people." Elite status was something to be
rejected; it was not something likely to serve as the foundation
for a professional ethic.
Finally, in the 1960s and 70s, postmodern thought swept the
university. Its messages undercut the possibility of a professional
ethic in a couple of ways. It first tore down liberalism's notion
that we could discover moral truth through reason alone. It recognized that moral thought is based on pre-rational assumptions
that emerge from communities, and that those assumptions can
vary from community to community. It disclosed the not-so-neutral assumptions of liberalism. A second (and more dubious)
postmodern message was that there is no truth to be discovered;
there is only power. Postmodern nihilism left no place for a
common social agenda. 2 2 Both messages undercut the possibility
of a pervasive professional ethic. If moral thought is rooted in
the presuppositions of communities, by what right do members
of one community impose professional obligations on those of
another? If there is no truth, only power, why should an attorney
do anything but seek his or her own power? In a postmodern
world there is not a shared moral foundation on which to build
and encourage professional ideals.23
In seeking to breath new life into the concept of professionalism, its advocates face the same problem that was faced by
those who drafted the ABA's 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The predecessors to the Model Rules provided aspirational standards for lawyers. Even the ABA Model Code, adopted
only fourteen years prior to the Model Rules, gave priority to ethical aspirations-its Ethical Considerations preceded and were
given more space than the rules that subjected a lawyer to disciof common ideals, it may be the only common goal that the lawyers in the
modern law firm share is that of money-making. See id. at 294-300.
22. SeeAnthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV.
751, 752-53 (1992). I share Cook's belief that the proper lesson from the
postmodern critique is one of humility rather than nihilism. See id. at 767-71.
We cannot know all of the truth, but we can seek it and act on our best understanding of it.
23. Some argue for the profession's return to the concept of noblesse
oblige. See, e.g., Philip S. Stamatakos, The Bar in America: The Role of Elitism in a
Liberal Democracy, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 853, 886 (1993) ("Elitism therefore
should be redefined with regard to the Bar in a way commensurate with the
concept of noblesse oblige,"). But the status of the profession has dropped so
low that there is little prospect of building a sense of ethical obligation on it.
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pline (the Disciplinary Rules). But the 1983 Model Rules contained only rules. The profession gave up on defining the good
lawyer; the Model Rules defined only the bad lawyer. Attempts
to establish a new professionalism face a similar prospect. They
may have an even more challenging task. There is probably less
common moral ground within the legal profession now than in
1983. It may be that a shared conception of the lawyer's moral
responsibility is no longer possible.
III.

THE DANGERS OF PROFESSIONALISM

My concern is not only that the new professionalism will fail
to inspire lawyers to virtue, but that it will inspire them to vice.
The concept of "professionalism" has an odd mix of meanings
and is used to justify all sorts of lawyer behavior, some of which is
not so good.
A.

ProfessionalSelf-Protection

The bar has always pointed to professionalism as a justification for its right to self-regulation: "We are professionals, we will
look out for the public interest." But much of the profession's
self-regulation has been self-serving. Historically, the legal profession justified its fee schedules, advertising prohibitions, rules
against unauthorized practice, low bar passage rates, and restrictive law school accreditation standards on the basis of professionalism. The profession argued that these practices promoted
higher quality legal services, but these practices also undercut
the bar's asserted goal to make legal services widely available.
The bar justified these practices as means of public protection,
but it is difficult to believe that they have not more often been
means of the bar's self-protection. Richard Abel goes so far as to
define "professionalism" as a matter of "market control"; he
found that when the profession has been able to limit entry, lawyer income has gone up, and vice versa.2 4 At the very least, the
bar had a conflict of interest as to these matters that undercut its
claim to the right of self-regulation. There is a danger that the
profession will use calls to professionalism to further insulate
itself from public accountability.
B.

The ProfessionalHired Gun

Some lawyers claim that unrestrained advocacy on behalf of
clients is an aspect of professionalism. Though they justify
aggressive advocacy as a matter of public service ("it will yield
24.

See ABEL, supra note 2, at 159.
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truth and justice and protect client autonomy"), it is hard not to
notice that lawyers most often protect the autonomy of those
who least need it-the wealthy. The adversary system is the legal
system's equivalent of the free market, and unrestrained advocacy, like unrestrained capitalism, is likely to benefit the rich
(and their lawyers), at the expense of the poor. Those who cannot afford lawyers need greater autonomy, but the wealthy clients, whom lawyers are more likely to serve, may need less
autonomy. They may need lawyers who will encourage them to
consider the interests of other people.
The growing use of the term "professional" to indicate a willingness to sacrifice one's standards for the employer is not limited to lawyers. According to Douglas Yeo of the Boston
Symphony Orchestra, he and his colleagues at times play
"pablum" and "drivel" while "gritting our teeth," but "as professionals we will play as well as we can anything that is put on our music
stands ... "25

Some lawyers glibly refer to themselves as hired guns, but
other lawyers, especially women, use a more troubling metaphor
for their lives as professionals: "It's like being forced into a sex
relationship you didn't anticipate. It's a screwjob. It feels horrible to do something that you wouldn't do normally ....I have to
contradict myself depending on what role I'm taking ....It's sort
of professional prostitution."26 Still other lawyers respond to the
moral challenges of law practice with professional distance from
the client and from what they do as lawyers. "I'm a professional.
I live and die by my reputation. I'm going to do a good job if I
think you're an asshole, [or] if I think you're a nice guy. I try and
be as professional as possible and I try to have a thick skin."2 7
For these lawyers, professionalism is moral schizophrenia,
with one set of values at the law office and another at home.
Lawyers live in cognitive dissonance, with their professional values in conflict with their personal values. One danger, of course,
is that the "professional" values will come to dominate all of life.

25.

Douglas Yeo, The Politics of Music,

FIRST THINGS, Jan.

1997, at 9

(emphasis added).

26.

RAND JACK

DECISIONS:

&

DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL

THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND

(emphasis added).
27. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added).

MEN LAWYERS

112 (1989)
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C.

ProfessionalPaternalisms,28 Old and New

The traditional lawyer's notion of professionalism was quite
different from that of the hired gun. The traditional lawyer did
not do what he was told by the client; he told the client what to
do. Whereas some of today's lawyers see their obedience to client wishes as a mark of professionalism, the traditional lawyer saw
his control of the relationship as a mark of professionalism.
Judge Clement Haynsworth reflected this view to a law school
graduating class:
[The lawyer] serves his clients without being their servant.
He serves to further the lawful and proper objective of the
client, but the lawyer must never forget that he is the
master. He is not there to do the client's bidding. It is for
the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right, and,
as a professional, he cannot give in to a client's attempt to persuade him to take some other stand ....
During my years of
practice, ... I told [my clients] what would be done and
firmly rejected suggestions that I do something else which I
29
felt improper.
Whereas today's hired gun has no place for the morals of the
lawyer, the traditional lawyer had no place for those of the client.
Lawyer paternalism also has a modem manifestation.
Whereas some lawyers play the hired gun attacking others at the
direction of the client, other lawyers play the godfather (the godfather of the Mario Puzo novel and the Francis Ford Coppola
30
films) -attacking others irrespective of the wishes of the client.
This lawyer, in the words of William Simon, resolves "questions
unilaterally in terms of the imputed ends of [client] selfishness." ' For some, this is a professional attribute of the lawyer.
As one client said, after his lawyer sought huge damages for a
dubious claim:
[T] he lawyer is a reassuring presence who takes away your
guilt feelings. He says, "Hey, this is the way the game is
played; you take as much as you can get; it's what they
28. The classic discussion of paternalism as an aspect of lawyer professionalism is Richard Wasserstrom, Lauyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
RTS. 1 (1975).
29. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Professionalism in Lauryering, 27 S.C. L.
Rrv. 627, 628 (1976) (emphasis added).
30.

See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,

MORAL

RESPONSIBILITY 5-14 (1994).
31. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJusticeand Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 56.

AND
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expect; it's the way it's done." [The lawyer] takes upon 32his
own shoulders the burden of your guilt-he's the professional.
For some, professionalism requires a lawyer to do whatever
the client wants; for others, professionalism requires a lawyer to
impose his morals on the client; for others, professionalism
requires a lawyer to direct the client to act selfishly. It may be
that in a postmodern world, the term "professionalism" can
mean whatever the lawyer wants it to mean.
IV.

ALTERNATE SOURCES OF VIRTUE FOR A

POSTMODERN PROFESSION

The foregoing has suggested that the concept of professionalism today is both too weak and too dangerous to yield the
responsible exercise of professional power. Other existing
sources of lawyer guidance have their shortcomings as well. The
market generates high quality legal services for savvy, wealthy clients, but gives little aid to the poor and middle-class and tends to
exacerbate the problems of lawyer advocacy as lawyers focus
solely on the interests of their wealthy clients. The rules of the
profession and legal malpractice rules set minimum standards
for lawyers, but law can only do so much. It is impossible to
require the virtues that the legal profession needs and excessive
regulation can undercut the possibility of developing those
virtues.3 3
In an earlier section of this essay, I suggested that in a
postmodern era it is not surprising that the legal profession has
been unable to establish a common ethic among lawyers. With a
more diverse profession has come the loss of a common moral
vision. It may be, however, that the key to renewed virtue in lawyers is to look within that diversity for moral insight. The very
thing that caused the death of the old professionalism may provide a possibility for moral renewal. If Alasdair MacIntyre is correct that moral development comes primarily from within
communities, 4 we should encourage these communities to
develop moralities (and theologies) of lawyering. It may be that
from the particular traditions of those within the profession will
emerge ways of lawyering that will transform not necessarily the
32.

DoUGLAs

E.

ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

171

(1974) (emphasis added).
33. See Robert F. Cochran,Jr., Lawyers and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
707, 721-25 (1996); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct:
Saltwaterfor Thirst?, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987).
34. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 220 (2d ed. 1984).
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whole profession, but the way that significant groups of lawyers
practice.
Many of the communities from which lawyers are drawn
have long traditions of moral discourse and reasoning, though
for various reasons there has not been a history of applying this
reasoning to the practice of law. Many of these communities
have not had members in the profession until recently. The
energies of many immigrant groups and peoples of color have
focused upon opening the profession to their members rather
than determining the moralities of lawyering that should apply
once they got there. Many have been willing to leave it to the
elite community that controlled the bar to define the good lawyer. But with the breakdown in professionalism, it may be up to
the traditions of those within the legal profession to define virtue
for their members. We need to begin to look to ways that our
various moral traditions can teach us how to be good lawyers.
Looking to particular communities for professional guidance is, of course, the opposite of the way that the profession
has dealt with such questions. Law schools and bar associations
separate the professional from the personal. What one's church,
synagogue, or other community of memory teaches is relegated
to one's personal life, not something which should have an
impact on what one does as a professional. The issue is framed
in terms of professional values versus personal values,3 5 and, of
course, in trying to decide what to do in one's professional life,
professional values are supposed to win out. However, increasingly, professional values have little power to inspire. In addition, it is wrong to suggest that values formed within particular
communities are merely "personal values"; I have little faith that
the person, acting alone, will come up with values, professional
or otherwise, that are worth living by. But, our religious and
other moral traditions provide far more than 'personal' values.
They draw on memories, stories, virtues, and rules that have their
source beyond living memory; they have evolved over long periods of time, based on the wisdom of many that have gone before.
That is not to say that they are perfect; they are not. But they are
resources that their members should look to, explore, critique,
and draw from.

35. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal
Values and ProfessionalEthics, 40 Citv. ST. L. Rrv. 133, 133 (1992); Simon, supra
note 31, at 130-44 (proposing a "non-professional advocacy" model based on
personal ethics).
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The particular communities of which lawyers are a part may
not only be worthwhile sources of standards for their lawyers, but
they may also be sources of inspiration. These communites are
more likely than the profession to inspire lawyers to go beyond
the requirements of professional codes and against the incentives
of the market. Their teachings are the kind which are likely to
wake you up in the middle of the night with questions about the
direction of your life. They can change the way a person lives.
Let me illustrate the effect that particular traditions might
have on lawyers with a look at one of the most important issues
facing the legal profession, the need for legal services to the
poor, from the perspective of the tradition that I know best, my
own evangelical Christian tradition. My tradition is not one that
has had many leaders of the profession. Most of its lawyers practice alone or in small groups. It is a tradition that has often
focused on other-worldly concerns-on personal salvation, on
the spiritual life, on the end times, and on heaven-at the
expense of what the tradition might say about life in this world.
As such, it has generally been a willing partner to the divided,
professional life/personal life thinking that has been dominant
among lawyers.
The need of the poor for legal services is an oft-told tale.
The need is huge. The federal government has severely cut back
its support, and there is little support within the bar for
mandatory pro bono service. The only realistic option seems to
be encouraging contributions and volunteer service. The question is how best to inspire it. Imagine that you are an evangelical
Christian lawyer or law student. Which of the following is likely
to affect the way that you practice law?
First, the profession's admonition from the ABA Model
Rules: "A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of
pro bono publico legal services per year."3 6 The comment to the
rule provides two grounds for the appeal: "personal involvement
in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most
rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer" and "the provision
of pro bono services is a professional responsibility .

. . .""

Ser-

vice to the poor can be rewarding, but it is also time-consuming,
hard work and there are many rewarding things that attract a
lawyer's attention. The bar's experience with volunteer-based
programs is that the inherent rewards of that service are not
enough for most people. Bar association emphasis on pro bono
36.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

37.

Id. Rule 6.1 cmt.

Rule 6.1 (1983).
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service has been followed by an initial burst of activity, which has
quickly faded.3"
Next, consider the teaching of the Christian tradition. On
one of the many occasions when Jesus spoke of the Christian's
responsibility to the poor, he describes the final judgement:
[T]he king [Jesus speaks of himself] will say to those at his
right hand, "Come, you that are blessed by my Father,
inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation
of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was
thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me
clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison
and you visited me." Then the righteous will answer him,
"Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you
food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink? And
when was it that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you,
or naked and gave you clothing? And when was it that we
saw you sick or in prison and visited you?" And the king
will answer them, "Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one
of the least of these who are members of my family, you did
it to me." Then he will say to those at his left hand, 'You
that are accursed, depart from me into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you
gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not
welcome me, naked and you did not give me clothing, sick
and in prison and you did not visit me." Then they also
will answer, "Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry or
thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did
not take care of you?" Then he will answer them, "Truly I
tell you, just as you did not do it to one of the least of
these, you did not do it to me." And these will go away into
eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.39
Teachings such as this have led to the founding of the Salvation Army, the Sisters of Mercy, the Rescue Missions, and most of
the non-governmental providers of services to the poor in this
country. "IT]he most anomic individuals in our society, the
denizens of skid row for example, are cared for almost exclusively
by voluntary associations, usually religious in character. "40 When
38.

See Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final

Report to the the ChiefJustice of the State of New York, 19 HOFsTRA L. REv. 755, 824-28
(1990).
39. Matt. 25:34-46.
40. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE 32
(1977).
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asked to explain her service for half a century to the poorest-ofthe-poor in India, Mother Teresa responded that she sees Christ
in each of the poor. It may be that Christ's teachings and similar
teachings from other traditions can lead to the development of
ministries that serve the legal needs of the poor.
I am not suggesting that there are not similar values in other
moral traditions; my point is that there are. We need to draw on
the resources of all of our traditions if lawyers are to have and
respond to a high calling.
V.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Lawyers and law students need to be challenged to think
about the implications of their own moral traditions on their
lives as lawyers. Morality is more likely to take hold and to affect
one's life when it is drawn not from the ethical considerations of
the profession, but from the deepest source of values of the person. Traditions need to struggle with the implications of their
teachings for the practice of law; the bar and law schools need to
encourage and enable them to do so.
Of course, such work would not proceed on a blank slate.
There are hopeful signs: Jews debate their role in the adversary
system in the pages of Tikkun;4 1 feminists discuss the implications
of an ethic of care for the practice of law;42 Mennonites and
Native Americans introduce restorative justice as a means of reconciling criminal offenders and victims;4" the Critical Legal Studies movement explores religious sources of renewal for lawyers;44
faith-based ministriesjoin with lawyers to provide legal services to
the poor;4 5 books challenge lawyers to bring their religious val41. See Alan Dershowitz & Peter Gable, Current Debate: The Moral Obligation of Defense Lawyers, TIKKUN, July-Aug. 1997, at 7-10; CurrentDebate: The Moral
Obligation of Defense Lawyers (Part I1), TirKUN, Aug.-Sept., at 20-24. See also Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARnozo L. Rv. 1577 (1993); Russell G. Pearce, Jewish
Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDozo L. REv.
1613 (1993).
42. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Buildingan Ethic of Care into
ProfessionalResponsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's LayeringProcess, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985).
43. Symposium, Restorative Justice and Religious Traditions: A Post-Modern
Encounter, HAMLINE UNIVERsrrv SC1-OOL OF LAW, Oct. 22-23, 1998.
44. CLS Forum on Spirituality, San Francisco, California, Jan. 9, 1998.
45. For example, Bet Tzedek Legal Services (Jewish), Los Angeles, California; River of Life Mission Christian Legal Clinic, Honolulu, Hawaii; New
Mexico Christian Legal Aid, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Pepperdine/Union
Rescue Mission Legal Aid Clinic, Los Angeles, California.
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ues to the practice of law;4 6 and religious symposia in three law
from a wide variety of religious tradireviews provide reflections
47
tions on law practice.
The surprising thing is how little exposure lawyers and law
students have to any of this. The ABA has given little or no coverage to such sources of value for lawyers. I know of only five law
school professors in the United States who have taught seminars
exploring religious teachings and the practice of law.4"
Let me make a specific proposal. Law schools should offer
seminars that explore the implications of specific religious and
moral traditions for the lawyer. Students could explore the
implications of their own traditions for their lives as lawyers.
Such seminars might enable some to find meaning in the practo find ways that their practice might
tice of law and inspire them
49
serve the public interest.
VI.

Is

THERE HOPE FOR A COMMON PROFESSIONAL MORALITY?

Despite its weaknesses, dangers, and ambiguities, I do not
want to see the end of the professionalism movement. Its calls
for public service continue to have resonance with some lawyers.
Even if our communities of memory take up the challenge of
identifying lawyering values, that will not provide moral direction
for all lawyers. Many lawyers do not have moral traditions to
which they look for guidance. For many lawyers, professional
ethics may be the only source of guidance.
A final question is whether there is the possibility of a com-

mon professional ethic, or are we destined, at best, to seek pro46. See JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH
AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991); THOMAS L. SHAFFER,
FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A LAWYER
AND A CHRISTIAN: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT

(1981).

47. Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals'EthicalDilemmas, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1543 (1996); Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 TEX.
TECH L. REV 911(1996); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work,
66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
48. They are Thomas Shaffer at Notre Dame and the University of Virginia, Howard Lesnick at the University of Pennsylvania, Sanford Levinson at
the University of Texas, Joseph Allegretti at Creighton University, and me. I
was blessed to have been in the first of these, Thomas Shaffer's seminar at the
Univerity of Virginia in 1976. He credits that seminar with inspiring his book,
On Being a Christianand a Lauyer. The seminar profoundly affected the lives of
those in the class.
49. Such a seminar at Pepperdine led to the founding of our legal aid
clinic for the homeless, a partnership with the Los Angeles Union Rescue
Mission.
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fessional ideals within our smaller communities? It is my hope
that as we seek to identify lawyer ideals within our traditions, a
common vision will emerge; that, as Anthony Cook has said Martin Luther King found-as we go deeper into our particularities,
we find commonalities.' ° But I suspect that that is a long way
down the line for the legal profession. The business that we
should now be about is taking the moral resources that we have
and applying them to the practice of law.

50.

See CLS Forum, supra note 44.

